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Physical Layer Security in Heterogeneous Networks
with Jammer Selection and Full-Duplex Users
Weijun Tang, Suili Feng, Yuehua Ding, and Yuan Liu
Abstract—In this paper, we enhance physical layer security for
downlink heterogeneous networks (HetNets) by using friendly
jammers and full-duplex users. The jammers are selected to
transmit jamming signal if their interfering power on the
scheduled users is below a threshold, meanwhile the scheduled
users confound the eavesdroppers using artificial noise by full-
duplexing. Using the tools of stochastic geometry, we derive the
expressions of connection probability and secrecy probability.
In particular, the locations of active jammers are modeled
by a modified Poisson hole process (PHP). Determining the
jammer selection threshold is further investigated for connection
probability maximization subject to the security constraints. A
greedy algorithm is proposed to efficiently solve this problem.
The accuracy of the theoretical analysis and the efficiency of the
proposed algorithm are evaluated by numerical simulations.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, heterogeneous networks,
full-duplex, stochastic geometry, Poisson hole process.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the data explosion in wireless traffic, the issue of
privacy and security has become one of the most important
concerns in wireless networks. Due to the broadcast nature,
wireless communication is very fragile to be eavesdropped.
Traditionally, security is usually focused by upper layers.
Recently, physical layer security has been regarded as a
promising technology to complement and improve the security
of wireless networks. The basic idea of physical layer security
is to exploit the physical characteristics of wireless channels
to secure messages in an information-theoretical view. In the
pioneering work [2], Wyner showed that if the main source-
destination channel is better than the eavesdropping channel,
the transmitted message can be perfectly secured at a non-
zero rate. To this end, relay, cooperative jamming and artificial
noise are efficient approaches [3]–[5].
Recently, there has also been an increasing interest in
heterogeneous cellular networks (HetNets) as a means to fulfill
seamless wireless coverage and high network throughput in
next generation wireless networks. Due to the open system
architecture and densification, information transmissions in-
tended for authorized users are more vulnerable to eavesdrop-
pers in HetNets. Therefore, secure transmission is a significant
concern when designing HetNets.
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A. Related Works
Secure communications of one source-destination pair with
multiple cooperating relays were investigated in [6]. The
authors proposed three cooperative schemes to maximize the
achievable secrecy rate. To protect the confidential message
from non-colluding passive eavesdroppers, the authors in [7]
studied the secrecy performance for multi-input-multi-output
(MISO) systems via transmitting artificial noise in the null
space of legitimate channel. Secure routing in multihop ad-
hoc networks was studied in [8]. The authors in [9] proposed
an opportunistic multiple jammer selection scheme for multi-
eavesdropper scenario. In [10], the probability of secure con-
nection and ergodic secrecy capacity of one source-destination
pair with multiple cooperative jammers were studied, where a
secrecy protected zone around the source node and a interferer-
excluded zone around the destination node were designed.
The works [6]–[10] all considered one source-destination
pair, and there was no interference between the legitimate
nodes. Using the tools of stochastic geometry, the security
performance of cellular networks considering the cell associa-
tion and the information exchange between base stations (BSs)
was evaluated in [11]. This work was extended by [12] for the
downlink multiple-antenna cellular networks. Assuming that
the legitimate mobile users were potential eavesdroppers, the
achievable secrecy rates were analyzed in [12]. The secure
communication in uplink transmissions was investigated in
[13]. The closed-form expressions of the ergodic secrecy sum
rates for a random user were studied. The authors in [14]
developed a tractable framework for the average secrecy rate
in the three-tier wireless sensor networks consisting of remote
sensors, access points and the sinks. The authors in [15]
studied the artificial noise aided security performance in a
millimeter wave network for both non-colluding and colluding
eavesdroppers scenarios. The authors in [16] studied physical
layer security in multi-tier HetNets, where an access-threshold-
based secrecy user association policy was proposed. A mul-
tiuser MISO network with full-duplex users was considered in
[17], where the receivers transmit artificial noise for jamming
the nearby eavesdroppers when received information signals.
B. Motivations and Contributions
In this paper, we investigate a HetNet with friendly jammers
and multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers, which has not been
considered yet in the prior works. For the sake of easy deploy-
ment, all nodes in the HetNet are equipped with single antenna,
and the jammers are assumed to transmit artificial noise inde-
pendently. To alleviate the interference from jammers to users,
2we propose a jammer selection policy based on the received
jamming power at the users. That is, a jammer is selected to be
active if its jamming strength on the scheduled users is below a
threshold. Unlike the scheme in [9], we consider the path loss
effects in this paper since the large-scale fading is dominant
in received signal strength. Hence each scheduled user is
associated with a guard zone around. To enhance security in
the guard zones where the friendly jammers are silent, we
assume that the users have the capability of full duplex so that
they can confound the eavesdroppers by transmitting artificial
noise when they receive the information from their serving
BSs. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follow:
1) A new physical layer security scheme in HetNets is
designed, where jammer selection along with full-duplex
users’ artificial noise are used. Significant improvements
of the system performance are obtained.
2) Using stochastic geometry tools, we derive the tractable
analyses of user connection probability and user secrecy
probability. In particular, the locations of the active jam-
mers are modeled by a modified Poisson hole process
(PHP), where the baseline Poisson point process (PPP) of
jammers are homogeneous and the locations of the holes
(i.e. the scheduled users) are modeled by inhomogeneous
PPP. The lower bounds for the Laplace transform of
interference from active jammers are obtained.
3) The SINR thresholds for user connection and secrecy
transmission and the jammer selection threshold are
jointly optimized. The optimization problem is formu-
lated as a nonlinear programming for user connection
probability maximization subject to secrecy probability
and secrecy rate constraints. An efficient algorithm is
proposed for solving this problem.
4) Valuable insights are provided for practical designs. In
particular, the user connection probability is independent
of the associated tier, and the secrecy performance of the
users in small cells is better than that in macro cells. The
user connection probability is improved by increasing the
jammer density and the jammer transmit power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model. Section III provides the analytical
results. The optimization problem and the numerical results
are shown in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Section
VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a downlink K-tier HetNet where the BSs
in different tiers sharing the same frequency band. Define
K , {1, 2, · · ·K}. The BS locations of tier t are distributed
as an independent homogeneous PPP Φt with density λt in a
two-dimensional plane R2. As shown in Fig. 1, there users and
eavesdroppers coexist. The users are authorized destinations
which are full-duplex capable. The eavesdroppers attempt to
intercept the confidential information intended for the users.
Friendly jammers are deployed to ensure the secrecy trans-
mission by sending artificial noise independently. The users,
the eavesdroppers and the jammers are spatially distributed
according to independent homogeneous PPPs ΦU , ΦE and ΦJ
with densities λU , λE and λJ , respectively. λU is assumed to
be much greater than {λt}t∈K so that there are associated
users in each BS. Every BS in tier t has the same transmit
power Pt. PJ and PU are denoted as the transmit power of
jammers and users, respectively. All the nodes in this network
are equipped with single antenna.
We consider both large-scale and small-scale fading for
wireless channels. The path loss model l(d) = d−α is adopted
for the large-scale fading, where d is the propagation distance,
and α > 2 is the path loss exponent. For the small-scale fading,
we assume independent Rayleigh fading, and the channel
gains follow the exponential distribution with unit power. Note
that shadow fading can be approximately modeled by the
randomness of the node locations [18]. Hence shadowing is
omitted here for simplicity and tractability.
We consider an open access HetNet so that a user
is associated with (the nearest BS in) tier k, if k =
argmaxt∈K PtD
−α
t , where Dt is denoted as the distance
between the user and its nearest BS in tier t. The associated
BS is called the serving BS. After the user association, each
BS schedules its associated users according to time division
multiple access (TDMA), i.e., scheduling one user in each time
slot. Therefore, there is no intra-cell interference (but inter-cell
interference still exist due to full spectrum reuse).
A. Jammer Selection and Full-Duplex User Jamming
Jammers are placed into the network for securing the
legitimate transmission. However, since the locations and the
channel state information (CSI) of passive eavesdroppers are
unavailable, it is difficult to select the jammers according to
their locations and CSI. Moreover, the jammers simultaneously
interfere with the users when confounding eavesdroppers, and
thus degrade the user connection outage performance. Hence,
we propose a jammer selection scheme to protect users from
over jamming. A jammer is selected to be active if its inter-
ference to any scheduled user is below the jammer selection
threshold τ , i.e. ΦsJ = {j|j ∈ ΦJ , PJD−αj,ui < τ, ∀ui ∈ ΦsU}.
ΦsJ denotes the point process of active jammers. Dx,y denotes
the distance between node x and y. ΦsU =
⋃
t∈K Φ
s
U,t, where
ΦsU,t is the point process of scheduled users in tier t. According
to this scheme, there is a guard zone (also called hole in the
rest of this paper) around each scheduled user, as shown in
Fig. 1. Denote the radius of each guard zone by Rτ , we have
Rτ =
(
PJ
τ
)1/α
. (1)
Hence ΦsJ can be expressed as
ΦsJ = ΦJ \
⋃
y∈Φs
U
B(y, Rτ ), (2)
where B(y, Rτ ) ≡ {z ∈ R2 : ‖z − y‖ < Rτ} is a ball of
radius Rτ centered at y. Therefore, Φ
s
J is a (modified) PHP
which can be formally defined in terms of two independent
point processes: ΦJ and Φ
s
U . ΦJ represents the baseline PPP
from which the holes are carved out, and ΦsU represents the
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Fig. 1. An instance of HetNet with the proposed jammer selection scheme and full-duplex users.
locations of holes. More discussions about ΦsJ are shown in
the next section.
The proposed jammer selection scheme can restrain the
interference to scheduled users from jammers. However, it
leaves jammer-excluded zones around the scheduled users,
which can be exploited by nearby eavesdroppers. Hence we
assume that the users are full-duplex capable. The scheduled
users transmit artificial noise simultaneously when they are
listening to their serving BSs. Thanks to self-interference
cancellation (SIC), the legitimate users can suffer low self-
interference while the eavesdroppers are being confounded.
An instance of our scheme is shown in Fig. 1. For ease of
reading, the notations in this paper are summarized in Table
I.
III. ANALYTICAL MODELING AND RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the connection probability and
the secrecy probability of a randomly located user. Denote θc
and θs as the SINR thresholds for user connection and secrecy
transmission. We assume that a user can decode the secret
messages if its received SINR is greater than θc. On the other
hand, an eavesdropper can not get any confidential information
from the messages when its received SINR is less than θs.
A. User Connection Probability
Without loss of generality, we consider a typical user located
at the origin, which is denoted as u0 and its serving BS (also
called the tagged BS) is b0. The user connection probability
is defined as
Pc(θc, τ) , P (SINRU ≥ θc) , (3)
where SINRU is given by
SINRU =
Pb0hb0,u0D
−α
b0,u0
IB + IU + IJ +NS +N0
. (4)
Pb0 is the transmit power of the tagged BS. The small-
scale fading between node x and y is denoted as hx,y.
The cumulative interference from the BSs (except its serving
BS) is given by IB =
∑
t∈K
∑
bi∈Φt\b0
Pthbi,u0D
−α
bi,u0
.
Similarly, IU and IJ are the cumulative interference from
TABLE I
NOTATION SUMMARY
Notation Description
Φt,ΦU ,ΦE ,ΦJ
Point process of BSs in tier t / users /
eavesdroppers / jammers
ΦsU ,Φ
s
U,t,Φ
s
J
Point process of scheduled users /
scheduled users in tier t / active jammers
λt, λU , λE , λJ
Density of BSs in tier t / users /
eavesdroppers / jammers
λsU , λ
s
U,t
Density of scheduled users /
scheduled users in tier t
Pt, PU , PJ Transmit power of BSs in tier t / users / jammers
NS ;N0 residual self-interference; thermal noise
τ ;Rτ
Jammer selection threshold;
the radius of guard zone
α; β Path loss exponent; SIC capacity
Dt
Distance from the typical user to
its closest BS in tier t
Di,j Distance between node i and node j
hi,j Small scale fading between node i and node j
At
Association probabilities of
the typical user to tier t
IB, IU , IJ
Cumulative interference on the typical
user from BSs / scheduled users / active jammers
I′
B
, I′
U
, I′
J
Cumulative interference on the eavesdropper
from BSs / scheduled users / active jammers
θc, θs
SINR threshold for user connection /
secrecy transmission
Pc,Ps User connection / secrecy probability
PT ,RT
Quality of service requirements of
secrecy probability / secrecy rate
∆ Step size in Algorithm 1
scheduled users and active jammers, respectively, which are
given by IU =
∑
t∈K
∑
ui∈ΦsU,t\u0
PUhui,u0D
−α
ui,u0 and
IJ =
∑
zi∈ΦsJ
PJhzi,u0D
−α
zi,u0 . NS and N0 represent the
residual self-interference and the thermal noise, respectively.
In this paper, we assume a linear residual self-interference
performance as NS = βPU , where β is the SIC capacity.
4To derive the theoretical analyses, we use some conclusions
proposed in [19], which are summarized as the following
Lemma 1, 2 and 3.
Lemma 1. The association probability that the serving BS of
the typical user is in tier k is given by
Ak = λkP
2/α
k∑
t∈K λtP
2/α
t
. (5)
Lemma 2. Conditioned on b0 ∈ Φk, the probability distribu-
tion function (PDF) of Db0,u0 is given by
fDb0,u0 (r) = fDk(r) =
2piλkr
Ak exp
(
− pir
2
P
2/α
k
Ξ
)
, (6)
where Ξ =
∑
t∈K λtP
2/α
t .
Lemma 3. Conditioned on Db0,u0 = r and b0 ∈ Φk, the
Laplace transform of the interference from BSs to the typical
user is
LIB (s)
=
∏
t∈K
exp
(
− 2piλt
sPt∆
2−α
k,t
α− 2 2F1(1, 1−
2
α
; 2− 2
α
;− sPt
∆αk,t
)
)
,
(7)
where ∆k,t = r(
Pt
Pk
)1/α, and 2F1(a, b; c; d) is the Gauss
hypergeometric function.
Due to the scheduling and association criteria, only one user
per BS interferes with the typical user. Therefore, {ΦsU,t} are
not PPPs but Poisson-Voronoi perturbed lattice [20]. Moreover,
there exists correlation between the typical user and the
interfering nodes [21]. To make it tractable, we characterize
the scheduled users as inhomogeneous PPPs like in [21], [22].
Assumption 1. Conditioned on Db0,u0 = r and b0 ∈ Φk, the
point processes of scheduled users are assumed to be Poisson
and independent with intensity measure function as
λsU,t(r, y) = λt
(
1− exp
(
− pi(r + y)2λt(Pt
Pk
)2/α
))
, (8)
λsU (r, y) =
∑
t∈K
λsU,t(r, y), (9)
where y is the distance to the typical user. Please refer to
Appendix A for more details about these point processes.
Using Assumption 1, we can have the Laplace transform
of the interference from scheduled users to the typical user as
shown in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Conditioned on Db0,u0 = r and b0 ∈ Φk, the
Laplace transform of the interference from scheduled users to
the typical user is
LIU (s)
=
∏
t∈K
exp
(
− 2pi
∫ ∞
0
λsU,t(r, y)(1 − Lh(sPUy−α))ydy
)
,
(10)
where Lh(s) = 11+s is the Laplace transform of h ∼ exp(1).
Proof:
LIU (s) = E
[
exp(−s(
∑
t∈K
∑
ui∈ΦsU,t\u0
PUhui,u0D
−α
ui,u0))
]
(a)
=
∏
t∈K
EΦs
U,t
[ ∏
ui∈ΦsU,t\u0
Lh(sPUD−αui,u0)
]
(b)
=
∏
t∈K
exp
(
− 2pi
∫ ∞
0
λsU,t(r, y)(1 − Lh(sPUy−α))ydy
)
,
(11)
where (a) follows that the small-scale fading h and the point
processes {ΦsU,t} are mutually independent. (b) is obtained
by using the probability generating functional (PGFL) of PPP
[23].
We now introduce our approach to characterize the Laplace
transform of interference from active jammers. We model the
locations of jammers by a homogeneous PPP ΦJ of density
λJ . The guard zones with radius Rτ are carved out according
to the jammer selection scheme. The locations of the centers of
these holes are the scheduled users ΦsU . As discussed above,
ΦsU is modeled as an inhomogeneous PPP. Therefore Φ
s
J is
not a standard PHP which can be defined in terms of two
independent homogeneous PPPs [24]. In this paper, we call the
type of point process as ΦsJ modified PHP. A modified PHP
can be defined in terms of two independent PPPs: the baseline
PPP and the locations of the holes. The holes are carved out
from the baseline PPP (e.g. ΦJ ) which is homogeneous, while
the locations of the holes (e.g. ΦsU ) are inhomogeneous. On the
same lines as discussed in [24], characterizing the interference
experienced by the typical user in a (modified) PHP precisely
is complicated. Hence, we consider only two holes: (i) the one
around the typical user, and (ii) the one that is closest to the
typical users, and ignore the other holes. This is reasonable
because the influence of the carved-holes which are far from
the typical user is limited due to the path loss. This approach
captures the local neighborhood of the typical user accurately
and provides an upper bound of the interference from active
jammers. Using this approach, we derive the Laplace transform
of interference from active jammers as shown in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. Conditioned on Db0,u0 = r and b0 ∈ Φk, the
Laplace transform of the interference from active jammers to
the typical user is
LIJ (s)
= exp
(
− 2piλJ sPJR
2−α
τ
α− 2 2F1(1, 1−
2
α
; 2− 2
α
;−sPJ
Rατ
)
)
×
∫ ∞
0
H(v, s)f(v)dv, (12)
where
H(v, s) = exp
( ∫ v+Rτ
max{v−Rτ ,Rτ}
2yλ′J(y)
1 + y
α
sPJ
dy
)
, (13)
f(v) = 2piλsU (r, v)v exp(−2pi
∫ v
0
λsU (r, y)ydy), (14)
λ′J(y) = λJ arccos(
y2 + v2 −R2τ
2yv
). (15)
5Proof: Please see Appendix B.
Theorem 1. The user connection probability of a typical user
is given by
Pc(θc, τ) =
∑
k∈K
Ak
∫ ∞
0
exp(−(NS +N0)ζk(r))LIB (ζk(r))
× LIU (ζk(r))LIJ (ζk(r))fDk (r)dr,
(16)
where ζk(r) =
θcr
α
Pk
. LIB (s), LIU (s), LIJ (s) and fDk(r) are
(7), (10), (12) and (6), respectively.
Proof: Note that IU and IJ are correlated because the
locations of the scheduled users are also the centers of the
guard zones. However, the baseline point process ΦJ and the
locations of the scheduled users are mutually independent.
Besides, we only consider the two closest holes of the active
jammers. Thus the correlation of IU and IJ is weak, which is
neglected here for the sake of tractability. Then we have
P(SINRU ≥ θc|b0 ∈ Φk, Db0,u0 = r)
= P(
Pkhb0,u0r
−α
IB + IU + IJ +NS +N0
≥ θc)
(a)
= exp(−(NS +N0)ζk(r))
× LIB (ζk(r))LIU (ζk(r))LIJ (ζk(r)), (17)
where (a) follows due to the assumption that the small-scale
fading is i.i.d. exponential distribution with unit power, and
IB , IU and IJ are mutually independent. Then it is easy to
get (16) by applying
Pc(θc, τ)
=
∑
k∈K
AkEDb0,u0 [P(SINRU ≥ θc|b0 ∈ Φk, Db0,u0 = r)].
(18)
One can see that, the expression of the user connection
probability in Theorem 1 is very complicated. To obtain some
interesting insights, we adopt some approaches to simplify the
result.
1) Simplified LIU : To provide a simplified expression of
the Laplace transform LIU , we model the locations of the
interfering users as homogeneous PPPs. This assumption has
been widely adopted in the literatures [25]–[27]. Compared
with the inhomogeneous PPP assumption, this approach is
more tractable but less accurate.
Lemma 6. If the locations of interfering users are modeled
with homogeneous PPPs, conditioned on b0 ∈ Φk, the
Laplace transform of the interference from the scheduled users
to the typical user is
LIU (s) = exp
(
− piP
2/α
U
∑
t∈K λt
sinc(2/α)
s2/α
)
. (19)
Proof: In each time slot, there is only one user scheduled
in each BS. Thus we have the intensity of the interfering users
in tier t (i.e. ΦsU,t) as λ
s
U,t = λt. The Laplace transform LIU
is
LIU (s) = exp
(
− 2pi
∑
t∈K
λt
∫ ∞
0
y
1 + y
α
sPU
dy
)
(a)
= exp
( 2
α
pi(sPU )
2/αB( 2
α
, 1− 2
α
)
∑
t∈K
λt
)
, (20)
where (a) follows by replacing x = yα and
∫∞
0
xµ−1dx
(1+βx)ν =
β−µB(µ, ν−µ) [28, Eq. 3.194.3]. After some algebra deriva-
tion and using B(x, 1− x) = pisin(pix) , we have the result.
2) Simplified LIJ : To provide a simplified expression of the
Laplace transform LIJ , we consider the case without jammer
selection (i.e. τ =∞). Then we have Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. If there is no jammer selection, conditioned on
b0 ∈ Φk, the Laplace transform of the interference from the
jammers to the typical user is
LIJ (s) = exp
(
− piλJP
2/α
J
sinc(2/α)
s2/α
)
. (21)
Proof:
LIJ (s)
(a)
= EΦJ
[ ∏
zi∈ΦJ
Lh(sPJD−αzi,u0)
]
= exp
(
− 2piλJ
∫ ∞
0
y
1 + y
α
sPJ
dy
)
, (22)
where (a) follows by that there is no jammer selection. Then
(21) is obtained following a similar process in the proof of
Lemma 6.
Corollary 1. When NS = N0 = 0 and the locations of the
interfering users are approximated with homogeneous PPPs,
the user connection probability without jammer selection is
P˜c(θc) =piΞ
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− 2pivθcΞ
α− 2 2F1(1, 1−
2
α
; 2− 2
α
; θc)
)
× exp
(
− piv(θcPU )
2/α
∑
t∈K λt
sinc(2/α)
)
× exp
(
− piv(θcPJ )
2/αλJ
sinc(2/α)
)
× exp(−pivΞ)dv, (23)
where Ξ =
∑
t∈K λtP
2/α
t .
Proof: Using the results in Lemma 2, 3, 6 and 7 and let
v = r
2
Pk
, we can easily have
Pc,k(θc) = P (SINRU ≥ θc|b0 ∈ Φk)
= piΞ
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− 2pivθcΞ
α− 2 2F1(1, 1−
2
α
; 2− 2
α
; θc)
)
× exp
(
− piv(θcPU )
2/α
∑
t∈K λt
sinc(2/α)
)
× exp
(
− piv(θcPJ)
2/αλJ
sinc(2/α)
)
× exp(−pivΞ)dv, (24)
which is independent on the index k. From Pc(θc) =∑
k∈KAkPc,k(θc) and
∑
k∈KAk = 1, we obtain Pc(θc) =
6Pc,k(θc)
∑
k∈KAk = Pc,k(θc). This gives the result in (23).
The user connection probability is now independent of the
tier index. It means that all users have the same connection
performance in each tier. In Sec. V, one can see that, although
Lemma 1 is developed based on several approximations, this
property is almost true even without these approximations.
B. User Secrecy Probability
We investigate the secrecy probability of a randomly located
user. In this work, the user secrecy probability corresponds to
the probability that a secret message for the typical user can
not be decoded by any non-colluding eavesdroppers. Hence
the secrecy probability is defined as
Ps(θs, τ) , P(
⋂
ei∈ΦE
SINRE(ei) < θs), (25)
where SINRE is given by
SINRE(ei) =
Pb0hb0,eiD
−α
b0,ei
I ′B + I
′
U + I
′
J +N0
. (26)
A randomly located eavesdropper is denoted as ei. The
cumulative interference from all the BSs (except the tagged
BS) is given by I ′B =
∑
t∈K
∑
bi∈Φt\b0
Pthbi,eiD
−α
bi,ei
.
Similarly, I ′U and I
′
J are the cumulative interference from
scheduled users and active jammers, respectively, which are
given by I ′U =
∑
t∈K
∑
ui∈ΦsU,t
PUhui,eiD
−α
ui,ei and I
′
J =∑
zi∈ΦsJ
PJhzi,eiD
−α
zi,ei . In this subsection, the point process
of the scheduled jammers is modeled as a standard PHP,
because the locations of the holes (i.e. the scheduled users)
and those of the eavesdroppers are mutually independent. Thus
we adopt the approach proposed in [24] and only the closest
hole to the eavesdropper ei is considered.
Theorem 2. The user secrecy probability of a typical user is
given by
Ps(θs, τ) =
∑
k∈K
Ak exp
(
− 2piλE
∫ ∞
0
exp(−N0γk(r))
× LI′
B
(γk(r))LI′
U
(γk(r))LI′
J
(γk(r))rdr
)
, (27)
where γk(r) =
θsr
α
Pk
,
LI′
B
(s) = exp
(
− pis
2/α
∑
t∈K λtP
2/α
t
sinc( 2α )
)
, (28)
LI′
U
(s) = exp
(
− piλ
s′
U (sPU )
2/α
sinc( 2α )
)
, (29)
LI′
J
(s) = exp
(
− piλJ (sPJ )
2/α
sinc( 2α )
)
×
∫ ∞
0
G(v, s)2piλs
′
U exp(−piλs
′
U v
2)vdv, (30)
where λs
′
U =
∑
t∈K λt, and
G(v, s) =

exp
( ∫ v+Rτ
v−Rτ
2yλ′J (y)
1+ y
α
sPJ
dy
)
, v > Rτ ,
exp(piλJ (Rτ − v)22F1(1, 2α ; 1 + 2α ;− (Rτ−v)
α
sPJ
))
× exp ( ∫ Rτ+v
Rτ−v
2yλ′J (y)
1+ y
α
sPJ
dy
)
, v ≤ Rτ .
(31)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
It is worth mentioning that, although we adopt a few
approximations in this section, our theoretical analyses show
a good agreement with the simulation results in Sec. V.
IV. USER CONNECTION PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION
In the previous section, we derive the user connection
probability and the user secrecy probability for given SINR
thresholds θc, θs and jammer selection threshold τ . However,
in a practical system, it is necessary to design these thresholds
according to the users’ requirements. In this section, we try
to optimize these thresholds according to the users’ quality of
services (QoSs) in security.
A. Problem Formulation
To setup a secrecy transmission, there are two critical
requirements: the secrecy probability Ps(θs, τ) and the secrecy
rate Rs. The secrecy probability is required for transmitting
messages securely since locations and CSI of the passive
eavesdroppers are unknown. A given secrecy rate is required
for designing the secure coding and channel coding. The
secrecy rate is defined as Rs , [RU (θc)−RE(θs)]+, where
RU (θc) = log2(1 + θc) and RE(θs) = log2(1 + θs) are the
codeword rate and the redundant rate, respectively. Subject to
these QoSs, the user connection probability should be as large
as possible. Hence, we study the optimization problem as
max
θc,θs,τ
Pc(θc, τ), (32a)
s.t. Ps(θs, τ) ≥ PT , (32b)
RU (θc)−RE(θs) ≥ RT , (32c)
where PT and RT are the requirements of secrecy probability
and secrecy rate, respectively.
Plugging the secrecy rate definition into (32), the problem
can be rewritten as
max
θc,θs,τ
Pc(θc, τ), (33a)
s.t. Ps(θs, τ) ≥ PT , (33b)
θc ≥ 2RT (1 + θs)− 1. (33c)
According to the user connection probability definition (3),
the objective function is monotonically decreasing with θc.
Hence the optimal solution would be obtained when θc =
2RT (1 + θs)− 1, and the problem could be rewritten as
max
θs,τ
Pc(θc, τ), (34a)
s.t. Ps(θs, τ) ≥ PT , (34b)
θc = 2
RT (1 + θs)− 1. (34c)
7Moreover, one can see that the user connection probability and
the user secrecy probability have inverse monotone. The user
connection probability is monotonically decreasing with θs
(and θc), while the secrecy probability is monotonic increasing.
As the threshold τ increases, more jammers are selected to
be active and the secrecy probability increases. On the other
hand, as more jammers transmitting artificial noise, the user’s
SINR performance degrades and Pc(θc, τ) decreases. Thus the
optimal solution would be obtained when Ps(θs, τ) = PT , and
the problem (34) can be rewritten as
max
θs,τ
Pc(θc, τ), (35a)
s.t. Ps(θs, τ) = PT , (35b)
θc = 2
RT (1 + θs)− 1. (35c)
B. Greedy Algorithm
As shown in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the expressions of
the user connection/secrecy probability are very complicated.
Hence it is difficult to obtain the optimal solution of the prob-
lem (35). In this subsection, we propose a greedy algorithm to
solve the optimization problem efficiently, which is presented
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Thresholds Optimization Algorithm
1: Input: PT , RT , and ∆;
2: Initialization: R
(0)
τ = 0, θ
(0)
c = 0, θ
(0)
s = 0;
3: loop
4: Calculate τ (t) = PJ
(R
(t)
τ )α
;
5: Using the bisection method, calculate θ
(t)
s that satisfies
Ps(θ(t)s , τ (t)) = PT ;
6: Calculate θ
(t)
c = 2RT (1 + θ
(t)
s )− 1;
7: if Pc(θ(t)c , τ (t)) > Pc(θ(t−1)c , τ (t−1)) then
8: R
(t+1)
τ = R
(t)
τ +∆;
9: else
10: return θ∗s = θ
(t−1)
s , θ∗c = θ
(t−1)
c and τ∗ = τ (t−1).
11: end if
12: end loop
Algorithm 1 begins with no jammer selection, i.e. R
(0)
τ = 0
(τ (0) = ∞) (Line 2). In each iteration, we try to increase
the user connection probability by increasing Rτ (Line 7 to
8), since Pc is a monotonically increasing function of Rτ
(Line 4 is the relationship between τ and Rτ ). ∆ is the
step size of Rτ . Due to the complicated expression of Ps
in (27), it is difficult to derive an expression for θ
(t)
s from
Ps(θ(t)s , τ (t)) = PT . However, we can efficiently calculate θ(t)s
that satisfies Ps(θ(t)s , τ (t)) = PT using the bisection method
(Line 5), since Ps(θs, τ) is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of θs. The algorithm ends when there is no improvement
in the user connection probability and returns θ∗s , θ
∗
c and τ
∗
(Line 9 to 10).
Lemma 8. Given τ , the output of Algorithm 1 is optimal.
Proof: The user secrecy probability Ps(θs, τ) is mono-
tonic with θs. Hence, given τ , there is only one root θ
∗
s
Iteration
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0.03
0.032
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.04
0.042
Algorithm 1, ∆ = 5
Algorithm 1, ∆ = 10
Algorithm 1, ∆ = 20
Exhaustive search
Fig. 2. The iteration process and the performance of Algorithm 1 with
different step sizes
satisfying the constraint (35b), which can be obtained by using
the bisection method in Algorithm 1.
As shown in Lemma 8, the output of Algorithm 1 in each
iteration is optimal. Moreover, the objective function increases
in each iteration. Hence the proposed algorithm converges
quickly. In Fig. 2, we show three examples of the iteration
process of Algorithm 1 with different step sizes∆. The system
parameters are the same as those in Sec. V. One can see that,
the proposed algorithm converges quickly and approaches to
the performance of exhaustive search. The step size ∆ has a
great impact on the number of iteration. A larger step size
can speed up the convergence but might lead to a suboptimal
result (as shown by the curve with star marks).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the theoretical analyses and
demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed optimization
algorithm by using numerical results. A two-tier HetNet is
simulated. The densities of two tiers are λ1 = 1 BS/km
2 and
λ2 = 10 BS/km
2. The user density is λU = 100 user/km
2.
We assume that there is one eavesdropper around each BS on
average, i.e. λE = 11 eavesdropper/km
2. The jammer density
is λJ = 50 jammer/km
2. The path loss exponent α is assumed
to be 3.5. The transmit power are set as follows: P1 = 46 dBm,
P2 = 30 dBm, PU = 23 dBm and PJ = 23 dBm, respectively.
The jammer selection threshold τ is −80 dB. We assume that
the SIC capacity is β = −90 dB and the thermal noise power
is N0 = −174 dBm. All the results in this section are obtained
under the above parameter settings unless noted otherwise.
A. Validation and Insights of the Theoretical Analyses
Since we only consider the two closest holes of active
jammers in Theorem 1 (the closest hole in Theorem 2), our
analyses can provide tighter bounds on the simulation results
where the holes are small and sparse compared with the system
configuration where the holes are large and dense. Therefore,
we define four possible configurations: low density of holes
and small holes (LD-SH), high density of holes and small
holes (HD-SH), low density of holes and large holes (LD-LH),
8TABLE II
SYSTEM PARAMETERS SUMMARY OF FOUR CONFIGURATIONS
Configuration BS densities (BS/km2) τ (dB) Hole radius (m)
LD-SH λ1 = 1, λ2 = 2 −77 Rτ ≈ 100
HD-SH λ1 = 2, λ2 = 10 −77 Rτ ≈ 100
LD-LH λ1 = 1, λ2 = 2 −88 Rτ ≈ 200
HD-LH λ1 = 2, λ2 = 10 −88 Rτ ≈ 200
and high density of holes and large holes (HD-LH). As only
one user per BS interferes with the typical user, the density of
the holes is determined by the densities of BSs. The system
parameters of the four configurations are summarized in Table
II. Fig. 3 shows the user connection/secrecy probabilities in the
four configurations given by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 along
with the Monte Carlo simulation results. One can observe that,
our analytical results agree well with the simulations in four
cases. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are the lower and upper
bounds respectively, since the derived Laplace transform of
interference from active jammers is a lower bound on the
accurate results.
In Fig. 4, our proposed scheme is compared with two
benchmarks: (i) the traditional HetNet in which there is neither
jammer nor user transmitting artificial noise; and (ii) the Het-
Net in which all the jammers and the scheduled users transmit
artificial noise, i.e. τ =∞. As expected, our scheme provides
a good balance between the user connection probability and
the user secrecy probability. The benchmark (ii) provides the
best security performance, because the interference level in it
is the strongest. One can see that our scheme provides a close
secrecy probability to it. Meanwhile, the proposed scheme and
the traditional HetNet have similar performance in the user
connection probability, which is much better than that of the
benchmark (ii).
In Fig. 5, we show the user connection probability (CP) and
secrecy probability (SP) in the two tiers respectively. Although
here we do not adopt the approximations used in deriving
Corollary 1, the user connection probabilities in the two
tiers are still quite similar. Hence, maximizing the probability
Pc(θc, τ) can provide the best connection performance to the
users in each tier simultaneously. On the other hand, the user
secrecy probability in tier 2 is much better than that in tier
1. It is because the transmit power of BSs in tier 2 is much
lower. The associated users in tier 2 are located closely to
their serving BSs, while the eavesdroppers are suffering from
low received power. Hence the tier with lower transmit power
would be better choice for secrecy wireless communication.
Furthermore, the secrecy performance gap inspires that the
system performance with unequal QoS requirements is worth
studying in the future.
B. System Performance with the Threshold Optimization Al-
gorithm
In this subsection, we show the output of problem (32)
obtained by Algorithm 1. The requirements of the secrecy
probability and the secrecy rate are assumed to be PT = 0.9
and RT = 1 bps, respectively. The thresholds θc, θs and τ are
computed by Algorithm 1 with ∆ = 5.
The performance of different schemes with varying jammer
density are shown in Fig. 6. One can see that simply deploying
more jammers can not improve the system performance.
Without jammer selection, the connection probability gets
worse when the density of jammers grows (i.e. the solid
curve with circle marks and the dashed curve). On the other
hand, the schemes with jammer selection (i.e. the curves
with triangle and square marks) significantly outperform those
without jammer selection. The performance gaps increase with
the jammer density. As shown in Fig. 4, the proposed scheme
can provide a good connection probability while maintaining
a high secrecy performance. Hence, under the same security
requirements, our scheme provides much better connection
performance. According to the jammer selection policy, the
jammers whose interference on any scheduled user is stronger
than τ are prevented from being active. When the jammer
density increases, there are more jammer located closely to
the eavesdroppers, but the interference level suffered by the
users from jammers is mitigated and maintains low. Hence the
performance in the schemes with jammer selection increases
with the density of jammer. Furthermore, transmitting artificial
noise by scheduled full-duplex users also improves the system
performance remarkably, which is shown by the gap between
the curves with triangle and square marks. When there is
no jammer (i.e. λJ = 0), the scheme with full-duplex users
provides a 15% gain in the connection probability compared
with the traditional HetNet. However, this performance gain
evidently depends on the SIC capacity β. Fig. 7 shows the
performance in the two schemes with varying SIC capacity.
One can see that the SIC capacity has significant impact on
the connection probability. When β is larger than −70 dB,
there is no performance gain obtained by letting full-duplex
scheduled users transmit artificial noise.
We show the performance of different schemes with varying
jammer transmit power in Fig. 8. Simply increasing the
transmit power of jammer without jammer selection degrades
the system performance (as shown by the curve with circle
marks). On the other hand, the schemes with jammer selection
provide remarkable connection probability gain. The reason is
similar to that of Fig. 6. Without the jammer selection policy,
the interference level suffered by the users increases with the
jammer transmit power. On the other hand, the interference to
the scheduled users could be mitigated with jammer selection,
while the received SINRs of eavesdroppers drop greatly when
PJ increases. Hence our scheme could provide significant
improvement under the same QoS requirements.
Fig. 9 shows the performance of different schemes with
varying eavesdropper density. As expected, the eavesdropper
density has a great impact on the system performance. The
schemes with jammer selection provide the best performance
with the density varying from 1 to 21 eavesdropper/km2.
However, it is interesting to see that, when the density is
small (e.g. λE = 1 eavesdropper/km
2), the schemes without
full-duplex users provide better performance than those with
full-duplex users (the curve with square marks vs the one with
triangle marks, the dashed curve vs the solid curve with circle
9Threshold θ
c
 / θ
s
, dB
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(a)
Theorem 1
Simulation
Theorem 2
Simulation
Threshold θ
c
 / θ
s
, dB
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(b)
Theorem 1
Simulation
Theorem 2
Simulation
Threshold θ
c
 / θ
s
, dB
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(c)
Theorem 1
Simulation
Theorem 2
Simulation
Threshold θ
c
 / θ
s
, dB
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(d)
Theorem 1
Simulation
Theorem 2
Simulation
Fig. 3. Analytical and simulation results for the user connection/secrecy probability in four configurations: (a) LD-SH, (b) HD-SH, (c) LD-LH, (d) HD-LH.
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Fig. 4. The user connection/secrecy performance comparison among (i) the
proposed scheme, (ii) the traditional HetNet, and (iii) the HetNet in which all
the jammers and the scheduled users transmit artificial noise.
marks). When the eavesdropper density is sufficiently small,
there are few eavesdroppers located near the scheduled users.
Hence, it might not be worth confounding the eavesdroppers
using full-duplex given the cost of suffering self-interference
and interference from other scheduled users.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a novel HetNet scheme with jammer
selection and full-duplex users. We characterized the user
connection probability and user secrecy probability by us-
ing stochastic geometry. Especially, inhomogeneous PPP and
(modified) PHP were used for modeling the scheduled users
and the active jammers, respectively. A greedy algorithm for
jointly optimizing the SINR thresholds for user connection, se-
crecy transmission and the jammer selection threshold subject
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to security QoSs was also proposed. Extensive performance
evaluations were conducted. The results showed that the pro-
posed HetNet scheme could improve the system performance
significantly.
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APPENDIX A
We have (8) straightly following the derivation of (21) in
[22]. For the integrity of content, we show the derivation here.
As shown in Fig. 10, r denotes as the distance between the
typical user and its serving BS, and y is the distance from the
interfering user to the typical user. A user at distance r + y
is associated with a BS in tier t but not the tagged BS with
probability 1 − exp ( − pi(r + y)2λt( PtPk )2/α
)
. Note that, in
each slot, there is always only one user scheduled in each BS.
We have the intensity of the interfering users in tier t as
λsU,t(r, y) = λt
(
1− exp(−pi(r + y)2λt(Pt
Pk
)2/α)
)
. (36)
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Using the property of Poisson process [29], we have the
intensity measure function (9).
It is worth mentioning that, (36) is not a mathematical
approximation of the intensity measure of Poisson-Voronoi
perturbed lattice but a tractable modeling method. Compared
with the homogeneous PPP [25]–[27], the inhomogeneous PPP
captures the correlation among the scheduled users and is more
accurate [21]. This is validated in [21], [22] and Sec. V.
APPENDIX B
The Laplace transform of the interference from active
jammers is
LIJ (s) = E
[
exp(−s(
∑
zi∈ΦsJ
PJhzi,u0D
−α
zi,u0))
]
(a)
= EΦs
J
[ ∏
zi∈ΦsJ
Lh(sPJD−αzi,u0)
]
, (37)
where (a) follows that the small-scale fading on different
nodes is i.i.d. h ∼ exp(1) and mutually independent with
ΦsJ . According to our approach, we consider only two holes:
(i) the one around the typical user, and (ii) the one that is
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Fig. 10. An instance of the distance between nodes.
closest to the typical user, and ignore the other holes. Hence,
the Laplace transform can be expressed as
LIJ (s) ≈ Ex
[
EΦJ
[ ∏
zi∈ΦJ\C
Lh(sPJD−αzi,u0)
]]
(a)
= Ex
[
exp
(
− λJ
∫
R2\C
(1 − Lh(sPJ‖z‖−α))dz
)]
,
(38)
where C = B(u0, Rτ )
⋃
B(x, Rτ ) =
B(u0, Rτ )
⋃(
Bc(u0, Rτ )
⋂
B(x, Rτ )
)
. Bc(u0, Rτ ) is
the complementary set of B(u0, Rτ ). x is the location of the
closest hole to the typical user and (a) follows the PGFL of
PPP. Then we have
LIJ (s)
≈ Ex
[
exp
(
− λJ
∫
R2\B(u0,Rτ )
(1 − Lh(sPJ‖z‖−α))dz
+ λJ
∫
Bc(u0,Rτ )
⋂
B(x,Rτ )
(1− Lh(sPJ‖z‖−α))dz
)]
= exp
(
− 2piλJ R
2−α
τ sPJ
α− 2 2F1(1, 1−
2
α
; 2− 2
α
;
−sPJ
Rατ
)
)
× Ex
[
exp
(
λJ
∫
Bc(u0,Rτ )
⋂
B(x,Rτ )
1
1 + ‖z‖
α
sPJ
dz
)]
= exp
(
− 2piλJ R
2−α
τ sPJ
α− 2 2F1(1, 1−
2
α
; 2− 2
α
;
−sPJ
Rατ
)
)
×
∫ ∞
0
H(v, s)f(v)dv, (39)
where
H(v, s) = exp
( ∫ v+Rτ
max{v−Rτ ,Rτ}
2yλ′J(y)
1 + y
α
sPJ
dy
)
, (40)
f(v) = 2piλsU (r, v)v exp(−2pi
∫ v
0
λsU (r, y)ydy), (41)
λ′J(y) = λJ arccos(
y2 + v2 −R2τ
2yv
). (42)
The first term in (39) is derived by converting from Cartesian
to polar coordinates and the closed form expression follows
from the properties of the Gamma function [19, Appendix
B]. The second term follows from the cosine-law: y2 + v2 −
2yv cos θ(y) = R2τ (as shown in Fig. 11) and some geometry
derivation. Note that the centers of holes are the scheduled
users, and ΦsU is assumed to be inhomogeneous PPP with
intensity measure function (9). Thus, the PDF of the distance
v , ‖x‖ between the typical user at the origin and the closest
hole x is given as (41).
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Fig. 11. Illustration of Bc(u0, Rτ )
⋂
B(x, Rτ ).
The integral
∫ v
0 λ
s
U (r, y)ydy could be expressed in closed
form as
∫ v
0
λsU (r, y)ydy
=
∑
t∈K
(λtv2
2
− λt
(exp(−piCtr2)− exp(−piCt(r + v)2)
2piCt
− r erf((r + v)
√
piCt)− erf(
√
piCtr)
2
√
Ct
))
, (43)
where Ct = λt(
Pt
Pk
)2/α and erf(x) is the error function. For
readability, we maintain the integral form in (12).
It is worth mentioning that, in our approach, we consider
only two closest holes. Hence (12) is a lower bound on the
accurate Laplace transform of the interference from active
jammers.
APPENDIX C
The user secrecy probability can be expressed as
Ps(θs, Rτ ) =
∑
k∈K
AkP(
⋂
ei∈ΦE
SINRE(ei) < θs|b0 ∈ Φk)
=
∑
k∈K
AkEΦE
[
P(
⋂
ei∈ΦE
SINRE(ei) < θs|b0 ∈ Φk,ΦE)
]
,
(44)
where SINRE(ei) is given by (26). One can see that {Db0,ei}
are correlated when conditioned on ΦE . Hence, the probabil-
ities
{
P(SINRE(ei) < θs|b0 ∈ Φk,ΦE)
}
are not mutually
independent. For the sake of tractability, we ignore the corre-
lations among these probabilities. Hence, we have
Ps(θs, Rτ )
≈
∑
k∈K
AkEΦE
[ ∏
ei∈ΦE
P(SINRE(ei) < θs|b0 ∈ Φk)
]
(a)
=
∑
k∈K
AkEΦE
[
exp
(
− λE
∫
R2
P(SINRE(e) ≥ θs)de
)]
,
(45)
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where (a) follows the PGFL of PPP [23].∫
R2
P(SINRE(e) ≥ θs)de
= 2pi
∫ ∞
0
P(
Pkhb0,er
−α
I ′B + I
′
U + I
′
J +N0
≥ θs)rdr
(a)
= 2pi
∫ ∞
0
E
[
exp(γk(r)N0) exp(γk(r)I
′
B)
× exp(γk(r)I ′U ) exp(γk(r)I ′J )
]
rdr
(b)
= 2pi
∞∫
0
exp(γk(r)N0)LI′
B
(γk(r))LI′
U
(γk(r))LI′
J
(γk(r))rdr,
(46)
where γk(r) =
θsr
α
Pk
. (a) follows that h ∼ exp(1), and (b) is
obtained by ignoring the correlations among I ′B , I
′
U and I
′
J .
The point processes {Φt} and ΦJ are mutually independent.
When conditioned on Db0,ei = r and b0 ∈ Φk, the point
process of interfering BSs (i.e. Φt \ b0) is the reduced Palm
distribution of the PPP. According to Slivnyak-Mecke theorem
[23], the reduced Palm distribution of the PPP is equal to
its original distribution, i.e. Φt \ b0 = Φt. Then the Laplace
transforms LI′
B
(s) can be derived as
LI′
B
(s) =
∏
t∈K
EΦt
[ ∏
bi∈Φt
Lh(sPtD−αbi,e)
]
= exp
(
− pis
2/α
sinc( 2α )
∑
t∈K
λtP
2/α
t
)
. (47)
One can see that the locations of the scheduled users are
independent of the eavesdroppers. Hence the point process ΦsU
is a homogeneous PPP instead of the inhomogeneous one in
the user connection probability. According to the scheduling
policy, in each slot, there is always only one user scheduled in
each BS. Thus the intensity of ΦsU,t is λt, and λ
s′
U =
∑
t∈K λt.
The Laplace transform LI′
U
(s) is
LI′
U
(s) = EI′
U
[ ∏
ui∈ΦsU
Lh(sPUD−αui,e)
]
= exp
(
− piλ
s′
U (sPU )
2/α
sinc( 2α )
)
. (48)
The locations of active jammers forms a standard PHP. We
adopt the approach proposed in [24] and only consider the
closest hole to the eavesdropper e. Then the Laplace transform
of the interference suffered by the eavesdropper is
LI′
J
(s) = Ex
[
EΦJ
[ ∏
zi∈ΦJ\B(x,Rτ )
Lh(sPJD−αzi,e)
]]
= exp
(
− piλJ (sPJ)
2/α
sinc( 2α )
)
× Ex
[
exp(λJ
∫
B(x,Rτ )
(1 − Lh(sPJy−α))dy)
]
= exp
(
− piλJ (sPJ)
2/α
sinc( 2α )
) ∫ ∞
0
G(v, s)g(v)dv, (49)
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X
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Fig. 12. Illustration of the closest hole to the eavesdropper.
where
G(v, s) =


exp
( ∫ v+Rτ
v−Rτ
2yλ′J (y)
1+ y
α
sPJ
dy
)
, v > Rτ ,
exp(piλJ (Rτ − v)22F1(1, 2α ; α+2α ; −(Rτ−v)
α
sPJ
))
× exp ( ∫ Rτ+vRτ−v 2yλ
′
J (y)
1+ y
α
sPJ
dy
)
, v ≤ Rτ ,
(50)
λ′J (y) = λJ arccos(
y2 + v2 −R2τ
2yv
). (51)
x is the location of the center of the closest hole (i.e. the clos-
est scheduled user). The first term in (49) is derived following
a similar process to the proof of Lemma 6. The second term
follows from the cosine-law: y2+ v2− 2yv cos θ(y) = R2τ (as
shown in Fig. 12) and some geometry derivation. Note that the
centers of holes are the scheduled users whose locations are
independent of ΦE . Thus, the PDF of the distance v = ‖x‖
is given by g(v) = 2piλs
′
U exp(−piλs
′
U v
2). Plugging (46), (47),
(48) and (49) into (45), Theorem 2 is obtained.
Further discussion about the approach that only considering
the closest hole of PHP could be founded in [24].
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